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The traditional analysis of the notion of knowledge seems to neglect 
that although we gather many of our beliefs under the flag of “knowl-
edge” we do not always employ the same standards to bestow this title 
to them. The semantic thesis known as epistemic contextualism, instead, 
clearly vindicates and accounts for this phenomenon concerning our 
epistemic custom. Unfortunately, however, epistemic contextualism 
faces a severe objection – known in the philosophical literature as the 
factivity problem, – that seriously menaces its own survival. This objec-
tion, indeed, claims that the contextualist who endorses two well-known 
epistemological principles that he should not desire to give up (i.e. the 
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factivity principle, according to which knowledge implies truth, and the 
closure principle, that maintains that knowledge is closed under known 
logical implication) cannot coherently state his own theory. Here, after 
an analytical introduction of the contextualist’s thesis, we propose an 
analysis of the factivity problem by a critical scrutiny of the main strate-
gies proposed to solve the conundrum. We will show that some of these 
strategies make some interesting moves forward in the unravelling of 
the puzzle, but that these moves seem to be possible only at high costs 
for contextualism.
2. Contextualism and the Malleability of Knowledge
We human beings – says Aristotle in the first book of the Metaphysics –, 
naturally aim at knowledge, and every day we conform to this natural 
inclination by making efforts to acquire new information about ourselves 
and the world around us. It is a demanding and unceasing process, this 
one, that however rewards us with all sorts of knowledge. Take Tom, for 
instance. He knows 
that yesterday his friend Charlotte was in her office at 5 p.m.
that the Normans invaded England in 1066
that there are infinitely many prime numbers
that Naples is the third-largest municipality in Italy
that there is a novel by Ernest Hemingway before him,
and the list could certainly continue indefinitely. What is especially inter-
esting about the wide amount of propositions that we come to know 
during our lives, though, is that despite we label them all as “knowledge” 
it seems that we do not always employ the same criteria to bestow this 
title to them. Sometimes we confer it to our beliefs (and to the beliefs 
of other people) rather easily and sometimes we do not allow such a 
bestowal unless very high epistemic standards are satisfied. However, 
as Peter Baumann rightly points out, the traditional reflection about the 
notion of knowledge seems to neglect this aspect of our epistemic cus-
tom, assuming on the one hand that the notion of knowledge has certain 
fundamental and invariable characteristics, and on the other that when-
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ever we use the word “knowledge” we always refer to the same thing.1 In 
other words, says Baumann, this traditional approach takes for granted 
that “knowledge is orderly”.2 However, the notion of knowledge seems 
to be more complex and disorderly, in a certain sense, than it might be 
expected. Consider the following scenarios:3
Case A It is Saturday afternoon. Susie is walking around in the city cen-
tre and after a while she ends up in front of a renowned pastry 
shop. She would like to go in to buy some pastries, but since 
the shop is too crowed she thinks that it is better if she comes 
back tomorrow morning. But then she says to herself out loud: 
“Perhaps the pastry shop won’t be open tomorrow morning, 
several pastry shops are closed on Sunday. Should I buy the 
pastries now?”. “Don’t worry” replies a passer-by, “I know that 
this pastry shop will be open tomorrow morning. I was there 
three weeks ago on Sunday. It’s open until noon”. Satisfied with 
the passer-by’s evidence, Susie decides to come back on Sun-
day morning.
Case B It is Saturday afternoon. Tom and Louis are in front of the re-
nowned pastry shop, near Susie. They would like to go in to buy 
a cake for the birthday of their friend Charlotte, but they are 
dissuaded by the crowd in the pastry shop. While they are dis-
cussing whether to enter or not in the shop, they overhear the 
conversation between Susie and the passer-by. Then Tom says: 
“Did you hear that? It seems that the pastry shop will be open 
tomorrow, the passer-by was there three weeks ago on Sunday 
morning”. “Uhm” replies Louis, “the shop could have changed 
its opening days in these three weeks and Charlotte’s birthday 
is this Sunday evening: we need to buy the cake before then, 
and the cake she likes is sold only in this pastry shop. Does he 
really know that the pastry shop will be open tomorrow morn-
1 Baumann, 2016: 1.
2 Ibid.
3 These cases are clearly a variation of Keith DeRose’s Bank Cases. For the original 
formulation of the example see DeRose, 1992: 913.
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ing?” Tom admits: “Well, no, you’re right. It’s better to go in and 
to buy the cake now”.
If we consider the case A by itself (i.e. without thinking to the latter 
scenario) we will probably say that the statement
(1) The passer-by knows that the pastry shop will be open 
on Sunday morning
is true. However, if we consider the case B, again by itself, it seems that 
we will say the contrary, namely that (1) is false. Since the passer-by’s 
epistemic position with regard to the proposition “the pastry shop will be 
open on Sunday morning” looks to be the same in both cases, a question 
arises: does he know or not that the pastry shop will be open on Sunday 
morning? A too stiff theory about the notion of knowledge – a theory 
that perhaps might recognise itself in the assumptions of the above-men-
tioned traditional approach, – could incur some trouble in answering this 
question. Indeed, if there is one and only one standard for knowledge as 
the invariantist claims,4 or the (1) is true simpliciter or it is false simplic-
iter, a third possibility is not given. Yet, we have already seen that our 
intuitions concerning an example like the one involving case A and case 
B suggest that, in effect, we take (1) to be true in a certain circumstance 
and false in another, and that, depending upon the considered context, 
we tend to prefer one standard for knowledge instead of another. There-
fore, it seems that what we might deem as “knowledge” in a certain con-
text we might not judge as such in another, and that different standards 
for knowledge prove to be adequate in different circumstances.
Among the theories that have been proposed in contemporary episte-
mology both to solve the above-mentioned puzzle and to account for the 
malleability exhibited by our ordinary use of the term “knowledge”, the 
one that goes under the banner of “epistemic contextualism” or “attrib-
utor contextualism” (hereafter just “contextualism”) has become one of 
the most popular and discussed. Due to its popularity, contextualism has 
been proposed in many different versions, yet, although there are signif-
4 With the term “invariantism” is generally flagged the position of those who deny 
contextualism about the truth-conditions of a certain term. See Unger, 1984.
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icant differences between the positions advocated by the various propo-
nents of the theory, their shared starting point is the semantic thesis that 
the truth-conditions of knowledge-ascribing and knowledge-denying sen-
tences (as “S knows that p” and “S doesn’t know that p”) depend upon cer-
tain features of the context in which those expressions are uttered.5 So, 
accordingly, a sentence like (1) fails to express a complete proposition 
if closed off by its context of utterance. In fact, the contextualist claims 
that in order to fully understand the meaning of a knowledge ascription 
we should consider certain characteristics of the knowledge attributor’s 
context like, for instance, the practical interests, the expectations, the 
presuppositions, or the purposes of the knowledge attributor, as well as 
the goals of the conversation in which the attributor is involved.6 These 
features, indeed, are necessary to identify that set of conditions (i.e. the 
“epistemic standard”) that the epistemic position of a subject S must 
satisfy with regard to a given proposition p in order for a statement as 
“S knows that p” to be true in the context of the attributor. 
For a better understanding of the theory, consider again our previous 
example of the pastry shop: since the epistemic standard is different in 
the two scenarios (quite low in the first, more demanding in the latter) 
we have that, in the two cases, the sentence (1) expresses two different 
meanings. In the context of the case A it means that “The passer-by 
knows that the pastry shop will be open on Sunday morning according to 
a quite low epistemic standard”, while in the context of case B it means 
that “The passer-by knows that the pastry shop will be open on Sunday 
morning according to a much more demanding epistemic standard”. 
Therefore, since (1) expresses two different propositions in the two con-
texts, according to contextualism the speakers involved in each case 
(Susie in Case A and Tom and Louis in Case B) can simultaneously claim, 
respectively, that “The passer-by knows that the pastry shop will be open 
on Sunday morning” and that “The passer-by doesn’t know that the pas-
try shop will be open on Sunday morning” without contradiction: due to 
the different epistemic standards in place, they are both speaking truly.
5 Cohen, 1987, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2004, 2005; DeRose, 1995, 2009; Lewis, 1996.
6 DeRose, 1992: 915; Lewis, 1996: 559; Kompa, 2014; Baumann, 2016: 20–31.
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If contextualism has the remarkable merit of being able to solve puz-
zles as the one involving case A and case B, it should be noted that it is 
also able to offer original and effective solutions to well-known epistemo-
logical questions. Consider the sceptical hypothesis that we do not know 
that we have hands for we cannot rule out the possibility that we are just 
handless brains in a vat. Despite this hypothesis having a certain appeal 
(how could we ever rule out such a possibility?) it is also true that it con-
tradicts our strong intuition that, after all, we possess a lot of ordinary 
knowledge. Contextualism nicely harmonizes these two epistemic intu-
itions.7 Indeed, it maintains that sceptical hypotheses gain their appeal 
from the fact that, when they are mentioned, they put in place sceptical 
standards; thus, because in these contexts when we use the term “know” 
we mean something like “knowing by extremely high standards,” we are 
then compelled to deny to ourselves knowledge of many ordinary prop-
ositions that we would ordinarily claim to know. However, points out the 
contextualist, this conclusion (which is sceptical, indeed) cannot threaten 
our ordinary knowledge; the sceptic is able just to show that we do not 
know according to her extremely demanding standard, but she cannot 
prove that we do not know according to the ordinary standards that are 
in place in every day contexts. So, our intuition that we in effect know 
many things seems to be vindicated.
As we have seen, contextualism obtains highly interesting results from 
an epistemological point of view. However, one could wonder how the 
truth-conditions of knowledge ascriptions might change from context 
to context. Usually contextualists explain their thesis by making use 
of analogies. A first one involves gradable predicates – like “flat”, “tall”, 
“rich” or “strong”.8 The truth-conditions of gradable predicates, indeed, 
are believed to change depending upon the context; it is the context, in 
fact, that defines the parameter that determines how a gradable predicate 
applies in that scenario. The context of a conversation about basketball 
players, for example, will presumably establish a minimum height in 
order for a person to be “tall” that is significantly higher than the one 
7 For the contextualist anti-sceptical argument see Cohen, 1986; 1988; 1999; DeRose, 
1995; and Lewis, 1996.
8 Cohen, 1986: 580; 1999: 60; DeRose, 2009: 166.
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that could be adopted in the context of a conversation about eight years 
old children. Now, since knowledge ascriptions seem to vary in degree 
of “strength” or “goodness”, gradable predicates appear to provide an 
adequate semantic model to the contextualist. Another analogy often 
employed by contextualist resorts instead to the notions introduced by 
David Kaplan9 of “character” (the rule associated by convention to an 
expression that sets the contextual parameters to locate the reference 
of the occurrences of the expression in contexts) and “content” (the 
semantic value of the expression), and compares “know” to indexicals 
as “I”, “here” or “now”.10 According to this analogy, with a knowledge 
ascription like “S knows that p” we can associate a character of the form 
“S has a true belief and is in a strong or good enough epistemic position 
with respect to p”.11 
3. The Factivity Problem
Unfortunately, the promising contextualist project of accounting for 
the malleability of “knowledge” faces a serious obstacle in the so-called 
factivity problem.12 According to the proponents of this telling objection, 
contextualism would be incompatible with two undoubted epistemolog-
ical principles: the closure principle (according to which knowledge is 
closed under known logical entailment) and the factivity principle (that 
poses that knowledge implies truth). The argument of the factivity prob-
lem is indeed believed to show that if the contextualist endorses the 
two principles he will inexorably drift into a contradiction that would 
determine a sort of “self-defeat with respect to the contextualist’s com-
mitment to contextualism”.13 According to some authors,14 the factivity 
problem has serious and undesirable consequences for the contextu-
alist’s stance, so serious and so undesirable that it is maintained that 
9 Kaplan, 1989.
10 Cohen, 1999: 61; DeRose, 1992: 925.
11 DeRose, 2009: 3.
12 Williamson, 2001; Brendel, 2005; 2009; 2014; Wright, 2005; Kallestrup, 2005; Ste-
up, 2005; Baumann, 2008; Buford, 2009.
13 Ichikawa, 2017: 187.
14 See for example Brendel, 2005; and Wright, 2005.
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the contextualist should refute at least one of the two epistemological 
principle involved in the argument of the conundrum in order to avoid 
the contradiction. However, since this move would also entail really high 
costs for the theory (as we have said, both the principles are held to be 
extremely plausible) the contextualist seems to be forced into a blind 
alley. Thus, for contextualism cannot survive as an inconsistent theory, 
and yet it should also not give up closure and factivity, such an impasse 
seems to suggest that the only move left to the contextualist is to refute 
his inadequate or too theoretically expensive theory. 
So, let’s come to the argument of the factivity problem. In order to 
properly illustrate the conundrum we will resort to an example: it is Sat-
urday morning and Tom, a contextualist, and Louis have just moored 
their sailboat in the port of Naples. In the afternoon they move to the 
hinterland, far from the coast, and settle in a hotel. In the evening Tom 
goes to visit his aunt, who tells him that an unexpected terrible gale is 
storming the coast. The aunt asks Tom whether he knows where his 
sailboat is, and Tom, who is perfectly aware that the gale could have 
broken the moorings of the sailboat, is compelled to admit that he does 
not know where the sailboat is. 
Thus, in this context C
H
, the sentence “Tom knows that the sailboat is 
moored in the port of Naples” is false, or, more formally, if we denote 
with “know
H
” the property of being in a strong enough epistemic position 
with respect to a proposition according to the epistemic standard at stake 
in C
H
 and with q we denote the proposition “The sailboat is moored in 
the port of Naples” we have that:
(a). Tom does not know
H
 that q.
While Tom is with his aunt, Louis is resting at the hotel’s bar where no 
one is aware of the terrible gale that is storming the seaboard. In the bar 
a customer asks Louis, who was speaking about his sailboat, whether he 
knows where the sailboat actually is, and Louis immediately replies that 
he knows that the sailboat is moored in the port of Naples. 
So, in this context C
L
 the sentence “Louis knows that the sailboat is 
moored in the port of Naples” is true, or, again, if we denote with “know
L
” 
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the property of being in a strong enough epistemic position with respect 
to a proposition according to the standard at stake in C
L




Now, Tom, as a contextualist, should certainly recognise that the prop-
osition (a) holds – i.e. that his own epistemic position is not strong 
enough in order to make the sentence “Tom knows that the sailboat is 
moored in the port of Naples” true in C
H
. Furthermore, it seems that Tom 
should also recognize that (b) holds; indeed, as a contextualist he should 
be perfectly aware that in the context C
L
 the term “know” has different 
truth-conditions and that the sentence “Louis knows that the sailboat is 





. Thus, if we assume that someone has apprised Tom that Louis’ 
epistemic position is strong enough in order to satisfy the standard that 
is operative in C
L
, as a contextualist Tom should acknowledge that (b) 




(b), after all, expresses a true proposition that, from a contextualist point 
of view, is what Brendel calls an “eternal truth”:15 indeed, that Louis knows 
that the sailboat is moored in the port of Naples according to the stan-
dard in place in C
L 
is true in every context, not only in C
L
.16 
However, unfortunately for contextualism, from (c) we can derive a 
contradiction if we combine this proposition with the two aforementioned 
epistemological principles that the contextualist endorses. The first is 
15 Brendel, 2014: 107. Jonathan Ichikawa seems to agree with Elke Brendel on this point 
when he endorses Christopher Buford’s remark according to which “it is not an implication 
of contextualism that one stops knowing things when the conversation standards raise”. 
See Ichikawa, 2017: 187.
16 The analogy between the semantic behaviour of gradable predicates and the one 
that, according to the contextualists, is exhibited by the word “know” is useful to clarify 
this point. Consider the context of a conversation about basketball players: in such a con-
text the criterion that determines whether a person is tall or not will be probably one such 
that Tim, an five years old boy 1.80 meters tall, does not count as tall. Yet, even in such a 
context, a proposition like “As an eight years old boy Tim is pretty tall” will be presumably 
believed to be true. 
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the principle of the factivity of knowledge, which maintains that the verb 
“know” (likewise other expressions as “learn” or “discover”) implies truth:
(F). ((S knows that p) → p).
The classic principle of factivity should be however restated in order 





 that p) → p).
The second epistemological principle involved in the argument of the 
factivity problem is the widely-accepted principle of epistemic closure, 
according to which knowledge is closed under known logical implication:
(C). (((S knows that p) ˄ (S knows that (p → q))) → (S knows that q)).






 that p) ˄  (S knows
X
 that (p → q))) → (S knows
X
 that q)).
 Now, by virtue of F
C
 we can conclude that (b) implies q:
 ((Louis knows
L
 that q) → q).
Moreover, we can imagine that a contextualist like Tom knows the clo-
sure principle in his more demanding context – i.e. he knows
H
 the closure 
principle. Thus, because he both knows
H 
that (b) and that (b) implies q, 
for C
C





 that (b) ˄ Tom knows
H








but (d) contradicts (a), thus contextualism entails a contradiction.
The argument of the factivity problem seems to suggest that a con-
textualist who is in a context in which a rigorous epistemic standard is 
operative and who does not count as knowing a certain proposition p 
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according to that standard cannot coherently know that another subject 
S – who is in a strong enough epistemic position relatively to the same 
proposition p, – counts as knowing that p according to the standard at 
stake in a less demanding context. Thus, the contextualist seems to be 
committed to a sort of “semantic inconsistency”.17 However, as Brendel 
rightly points out, the factivity problem also implies a much more unde-
sirable consequence: indeed, the contextualist seems to be unable to 
know (independently of the context where they are) what Brendel calls 





 that p ˄ S doesn’t know
H
 that p.
Notoriously, the contextualist maintains that the same knowledge 
ascriptions can be true in a context, but false in another; therefore, 
according to the advocate of the view C
MT
 holds. Yet, when the contextu-
alist ponders about C
MT
, according to Brendel he should be in the more 
demanding context C
H
; indeed, thinking about the error possibilities 
entailed by that context – i.e. the context C
H
 – should be enough in order 
to make those error possibilities salient for him. Thus, the contextualist 
would be in a high-standard context C
H
 pondering about a conjunction 
of the form:
(a) ˄ (b)
and we have just seen that this conjunction cannot be coherently known
H
.
4. Four Strategies to Solve the Factivity Problem
4.1 Refusing (a) and (b)
In his article “Epistemic Contextualism and the Knowability Problem,”19 
Wolfgang Freitag outlines a general definition of the conundrum seen 
above. In his own words: “a theory c is said to have the knowability prob-
lem if and only if c implies that it cannot be known, i.e. that knowing the 
17 Brendel, 2009: 408.
18 Brendel, 2005: 49–51.
19 Freitag, 2011. For a similar argument see Dinges, 2014.
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consistent theory c leads to inconsistency”.20 According to Freitag, the 
necessary and sufficient condition for the occurrence of the knowability 
problem would be the existence of a proposition p such that there is a 
theory c which implies that: i) p is true and ii) p cannot be known by a 
subject S at a moment t in a certain context C
X
. Since the contextualist 
seems to be committed both to propositions like (b) – which maintains 
that q is true – and (a) – that instead argues that q cannot be known by 
a subject in the context C
H
 – the condition of the knowability problem 
appears to be fully satisfied. However, according to Freitag this conclu-
sion relies on a misunderstanding of the premises of contextualism, 
which, in truth, would not properly entail neither propositions like (a) 
nor propositions like (b). 
It might be thought that contextualism entails propositions like (a) 
because of the existence of sceptical contexts that seem to be con-
ceded by the advocates of the view. However, Freitag claims that con-
textualism does not, in effect, entail scepticism, since it is silent about 
both the epistemic standards at stake in different contexts and whether 
those standards can be satisfied by epistemic subjects. The commit-
ment to proposition (b) is instead usually deduced from the contextu-
alist’s anti-sceptical claim that our ordinary knowledge-attributions are 
generally true.21 However, as Alexander Dinges nicely points out, the 
contextualist does not maintain that a specific empirical proposition p 
is true, but only that our ordinary knowledge-attributions are, in gen-
eral, true; as we can “know that the tickets of a yet to be drawn lottery 
will generally lose even if [we] don’t know of any particular ticket that 
it will lose”, we can also know that the majority of our ordinary knowl-
edge-attributions are true without committing ourselves to the truth of 
any particular proposition.22 Therefore, contextualism seems to be not 
committed neither to a proposition like (a) nor to a proposition like (b). 
The condition identified by Freitag appears to be disarmed, and with that 
also the knowability problem.
20 Freitag, 2011: 279. Notice that in his paper Freitag prefers the expression “knowabil-
ity problem” to the more common “factivity problem” to denote the conundrum. 
21 Dinges, 2014: 3347. 
22 Ibid.
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This solution to the factivity problem seems to fall prey of two main 
remarks that concern the contextualist’s commitment to propositions 
like (a) and (b). Consider first the case of ordinary knowledge claims as 
(b)-like propositions: previously we have seen that Dinges refutes the 
commitment towards this kind of propositions resorting to the prima 
facie very compelling argument of the lottery, an argument that estab-
lishes an analogy between the following statements:
(2). S knows that many lottery tickets will lose
(3). S knows that many knowledge ascriptions are true.
Now, it should be noted that the truth of the (2) relies on the assump-
tion that there is, in fact, one winning ticket. Dinges notices this point, 
and he is aware that it could be objected that (3), the contextualist’s 
anti-sceptical claim, relies on the assumption that many knowledge 
ascriptions are in fact true. In order to block this objection, Dinges main-
tains that it is possible to justify the plausibility of (3) without any com-
mitment to any ordinary knowledge ascription. According to Dinges, 
such a possibility would be granted by appealing to a principle of charity 
“according to which it is “a strike against a theory of a common term of 
a natural language that it involves the speakers of that language in sys-
tematic and widespread falsehood in their use of that term””.23 However, 
it is by no means certain that such a principle can justify the plausibility 
of (3) without committing the contextualist to the truth of any ordinary 
knowledge attributions. Indeed, the principle invoked by Dinges seems 
to assume that ordinary speakers are, in effect, competent speakers of 
their language and thus that they correctly use the common terms of 
natural language. The principle of charity, therefore, seems to claim that 
a theory about a common term of the natural language like, for exam-
ple, “dog” would be extremely implausible if it entailed that ordinary 
speakers are systematically wrong when they use the word “dog” since 
the correct reference of this word were cats; in this particular case, the 
principle seems to assume that ordinary speakers use “dog” correctly for 
the correct reference of this word are indeed dogs. So, what about knowl-
edge ascriptions? In this case, in order to apply the principle of charity, 
23 Dinges, 2014: 3547.
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we should claim that, in the end, ordinary speakers use the term “know” 
properly, that is, that they generally attribute knowledge of a proposition 
to someone when this person, in effect, counts as knowing that proposi-
tion. However, this line of reasoning is an induction, and notably induc-
tions are justified by means of collections of evidences. Thus, even the 
contextualist who resorts solely to the principle of charity to support his 
anti-sceptical claim (3) seems to be compelled to assume the moorean 
fact that, indeed, many knowledge ascriptions are in fact true. Yet, if this 
conclusion holds, the argument that Dinges proposes to illustrate that 
(3) does not entail the truth of any knowledge ascription fails; thus, the 
contextualist seems to be committed, in the end, to propositions like (b).
Let’s now consider the commitment to “sceptical” (a)-like propositions. 
Freitag rejects such a commitment claiming that scepticism would not 
be part of contextualism. Yet, it’s by no means certain that it is so. 
Indeed, the traditional anti-sceptical argument deployed by contextu-
alists seems to perfectly legitimate sceptical hypotheses in all of those 
contexts in which such hypotheses are uttered; David Lewis’ rule of 
attention,24 for example, prescribes that when an error possibility is put 
in place it cannot be properly ignored and that the epistemic standards 
must rise automatically in the context. Freitag, though, cleverly observes 
that these considerations depend, for their effectiveness, upon the kind 
of contextualism that we are considering, and according to him, the 
right formulation of the theory that a contextualist should adopt is the 
following – which he labels “compatibilism”: 
(Compatibilism) ~∀X, Y: [K
X 
(S, p) ↔ K
Y 
(S, p)].
Compatibilism, as Freitag takes it, simply establishes that it’s possible 
that a knowledge ascription of the form “S knows that p” is true if uttered 
in a context X, but false if uttered in a context Y 25 and certainly is not 
committed neither to propositions like (a) nor to propositions like (b).
 
Furthermore, compatibilism, along with the additional assumption that 
there is at least one ordinary context C
L
 in which satisfying the operative 
24 Lewis, 1996: 559. 
25 Freitag, 2011: 278.
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epistemic standard is possible, clearly blocks the sceptical argument, for 
the sceptical claim that we do not know that p in the sceptical context 
C
S 




Could we then consider the factivity problem solved by Freitag’s refor-
mulation of contextualism? The answer to this question seems to be, 
unfortunately, negative. Indeed, even though compatibilism does not 
entail propositions like (a) or (b), it could be the case that an advocate 
of this view finds himself in an ordinary context C
L
 and, consequently, 
claims to know an ordinary proposition p. Being a contextualist – or, 
better, a “compatibilist contextualist” – he will presumably also maintain 
that, according to the sceptical standard at stake in the sceptical context 
C
S
 he does not know that p. As Montminy and Skolits rightly point out, 
compatibilism does not force its supporters to make this concession,26 
however, as Freitag also notices, it will be extremely odd for an advocate 
of the view to put aside scepticism since it is “a vital part of the interest 
of contextualism”.27 Therefore, it seems that the compatibilist will find 
himself in the situation depicted by the argument of the factivity prob-
lem, since he will have to maintain both that he knows
L
 that p and that 
he doesn’t know
S
 this proposition. The compatibilist, then, with regard 
to a result of its theory seems to be committed to a sort of “pragmatic 
inconsistency”.28 In order to block this conclusion, though, one might 
observe that this argument relies upon the assumption that the com-
patibilist is committed to the existence of a sceptical context. Now, we 
have already said that giving up scepticism would be extremely odd for 
a contextualist (or a compatibilist) but suppose that, nevertheless, one 
wants to insist that scepticism is not a proper part these theories: would 
this be enough to neutralize the pragmatic inconsistency? Again, the 
answer to this question seems to be negative. In order to summon the 
contradiction of the factivity problem, indeed, is sufficient to appeal to 
a high-standard context, not to a sceptical one. Consider our example 
of § 3: Tom, the contextualist, is not in a sceptical context, but simply 
26 Montminy and Skolits, 2014: 323.
27 Freitag, 2011: 281. 
28 Montminy and Skolits, 2014: 323.
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in a context where he does not know whether his sailboat is still moored 
in the port of Naples or not. As Brendel rightly points out, the factivity 




 such that the 
epistemic standard of C
X
 is more demanding than that of C
Y
;29 the conun-
drum, therefore, is not tied to the existence of a sceptical context where, 
for instance, the brain-in-a-vat hypothesis is in place, but simply to the 
existence of contexts that slightly differ in their epistemic standards. And 
since the acknowledgement of such a varying in the epistemic standards 
from context to context seems to be one of the main motivations for 
contextualism (or compatibilism), it looks that the compatibilist cannot 
deny his commitment to the abovementioned pragmatic inconsistency. 
Refusing the commitment to propositions like (a) and (b), thus, does not 
seem a promising way to solve the conundrum.
4.2 Refusing (c)
The most controversial step of the argument of the factivity problem 
seems to be the contextualist’s acknowledgement that another subject 
(in our case, Louis) knows (according to another standard) a certain 
proposition that the contextualist does not count as knowing. Anthony 
Brueckner and Christopher Buford label this kind of knowledge ascrip-
tions “asymmetrical” and in order to solve the conundrum they propose 
to drop them.30 The contextualist, indeed, according to the two authors 
would not be committed to asymmetrical knowledge ascriptions like (c). 
Yet, if a contextualist as Tom cannot acknowledge anymore that a sub-
ject like Louis knows
L
 that q, what should he say about Louis’ epistemic 
position regarding q? According to Brueckner and Buford, a contextualist 
like Tom should say something as:
“Well, it sounds as [Louis] is in a position to be saying 
something true via uttering his “knowledge”-sentence, giv-
en his wimpy context [C
L
] and ordinary evidence. So I know 
that the conditions for the truth of [“Louis knows
L
 that q”] 
are satisfied up to the “truth condition”, i.e. the condition 
that [q] is the case. However, to know that [“Louis knows
L
 
29 Brendel, 2005: 50.
30 Brueckner and Buford, 2009.
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that q” is true in C
L
], I must know whether [q] is the case ... . 
But I have just told you that I do not know [q]; ... [“Louis 
knows
L
 that q”] is not true in our context [C
H
]”31.
By assumption, indeed, Tom does not know
H
 that q, and therefore 
he is not in the position to know
H
 that (b) – i.e. that Louis knows
L
 that 
q. According to the classical tripartite analysis of propositional knowl-
edge,32 in fact, we could say that Tom knows
H
 that (b) if and only if: he 
believes that (b), his belief that (b) is properly justified, and (b) is true. 
Yet, since the truth of (b) presupposes the truth of q and Tom lacks this 
knowledge, he cannot acknowledge that Louis knows
L
 that q.
By erasing the contextualist’s commitment towards asymmetrical 
knowledge ascriptions like (c), Brueckner and Buford clearly manage to 
block the rise of the contradiction of the factivity problem. However, it 
seems that this move can seriously weaken the contextualist’s theory.33 
Brueckner and Buford themselves acknowledge that their solution sad-
dles contextualism with a “statability problem”: the contextualist thesis 
that in a low-standard context a proposition like (b) is true cannot be 
known anymore in a more demanding context.34 Brueckner and Buford 
maintain that the consequences of the statability problem are less dan-
gerous, for contextualism, than that of the factivity problem.35 However, 
if one might think that the contradiction of the factivity problem con-
demns contextualism to an outright refutation, it seems also that the 
statability problem entails serious limitations for the theory.
A first limitation seems to undermine the best argument to which the 
contextualist can resort to argue in favour of his own theory. Contextu-
alists in fact usually resort to examples like the one we have seen in § 2 
to show that it is true that the same knowledge ascription can be simul-
taneously true in a context and false in another. Yet, if the contextualist 
31 Brueckner and Buford, 2009: 434–35. The quote has been slightly edited in order to 
conform to our description of the factivity problem. 
32 See for example: Armstrong, 1973: 137; Feldman, 2003: 8–23; and Ichikawa and 
Steup, 2017.
33 See Baumann, 2010: 87–88; and Ichikawa, 2017: 187 (footnote 8).
34 Brueckner and Buford, 2009: 436.
35 Brueckner and Buford, 2009: 337.
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is forbidden to make asymmetrical knowledge ascriptions it seems that 
he cannot employ these examples anymore. So, suppose that Tom, the 
contextualist, claims to know an ordinary proposition p as “The kettle is 
boiling”. In order to argue in favour of his theory, he should say that, if 
a certain error possibility was in place, he would not know that p. How-
ever, by mentioning this error possibility he makes it salient and, conse-
quently, the standard in the context rises.36 So, he seems to be unable to 
utter the (b)-like asymmetrical proposition “I know
H
 that I know
L
 that the 
kettle is boiling” that is necessary to articulate the example that backs 
the contextualist’s stance.
A second limitation concerns unstatable truths. Consider the propo-
sition (b): from a contextualist point of view it seems that it is true that 
Louis knows
L
 that q since he believes that q is the case, he has adequate 
evidence for q (according to the standard in place in the context C
L
) and 
q is the case. As we have seen, the truth of a proposition like (b) is, for 
the contextualist, an eternal truth for notwithstanding Louis’ epistemic 
position does not satisfy the standards at stake in other contexts, it is 
still true (even in these other contexts) that his epistemic position satis-
fies the standard in place in the context C
L
. A truth of this kind, however, 
according to Brueckner and Buford’s reading of contextualism cannot 
be known in certain contexts – e.g. it cannot be known
H
. So, Brueckner 
and Buford’s solution implies that contextualism entails that some prop-
ositions that would be true in every context – and expected to be so by 
the contextualists, – cannot be known and uttered in certain contexts. 
Now, if on the one hand it might sound odd that in certain contexts the 
contextualists cannot know certain propositions despite they expect 
them to be true, on the other one could observe that everyone should 
be prone to admit that certain true propositions cannot be known and 
uttered in certain contexts.37 In addition, one might also point out that, 
although the contextualists expect certain propositions to be true, they 
do not know that them are true. Prima facie, therefore, the contextu-
36 It should be noted, indeed, that Brueckner and Buford do not refute the view ac-
cording to which the mere mention of an error possibility makes it salient in the context. 
Montminy and Skolits, 2014: 326. 
37 Thanks to an anonymous referee for stressing this point.
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alists can be perfectly fine with the conclusion that their view implies 
unstatable and unknowable propositions. However, it is worth noticing 
that the above-mentioned conclusion might threaten the contextualist 
anti-sceptical argument. Indeed, the Brueckner and Buford’s contextu-
alist who is in a sceptical context (a context where the brain-in-a-vat 
sceptical hypothesis is in place) is not able anymore to acknowledge, in 
that sceptical context, that according to a less demanding standard he 
knows that he has hands. Furthermore, since according to Lewis’ rule 
of attention the mere mention of an error possibility (as, for instance, a 
sceptical hypothesis) is sufficient to make it relevant in the context (and 
thus to install a more demanding standard in the context), the contex-
tualist’s anti-sceptical argument turns out to be unknowable and unstat-
able; indeed, if the contextualist claims that despite scepticism he knows 
that he has hands according to ordinary standards, the mere mention 
of the sceptical hypothesis will install in the context a more demanding 
standard according to which he does not know such thing.38 And this 
one seems to be a really undesirable conclusion for those contextualists 
who want to preserve the effectiveness of their anti-sceptical argument.
On this point Jonathan J. Ichikawa observes that the anti-sceptical argu-
ment is a relatively important part of the contextualist theory.39 So, one 
might be led to believe that giving up the anti-sceptical argument is not 
a serious issue for the contextualists. However, it should be considered 
that albeit the anti-sceptical argument is not “a mandatory feature” of 
contextualism,40 it is one of its most important applications as well as 
one of its main motivations. Now, notoriously the other pivotal motiva-
tion for contextualism is provided by the so-called argument from the 
ordinary language – according to which contextualism would account 
for our ordinary use of knowledge ascriptions.41 Yet, if some of our 
semantic intuitions are perfectly explained by contextualism (think, for 
instance, to the pairs of cases as the one of § 2), other seem to contra-
38 Buford, 2009: 116.
39 Ichikawa, 2017: 191.
40 Ibid.
41 DeRose, 2009: 47–79.
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dict the predictions of the theory.42 This is so true, that the contextu-
alists came to acknowledge that, sometimes, we suffer of a “semantic 
blindness” with regard to the context-sensitivity of knowledge ascrip-
tions.43 The argument from the ordinary language, therefore, does not 
seem to straightforwardly support contextualism. In addition, if some 
experimental studies on the linguistic behaviour of ordinary speakers 
have found evidence that is consistent with contextualism,44 many other 
seem to come to the opposite verdict.45 So, although the contextualists 
do not lack of arguments to oppose their invariantist critics,46 it seems 
that it would be a good idea for them to support their view not only with 
semantic considerations, but also with other arguments. In this sense, 
renouncing to the anti-sceptical argument – probably the most important 
motivation for the view together with the argument from the ordinary 
language, – is probably a dangerous move.
Ichikawa, however, moves another consideration that directly addresses 
our line of reasoning: he proposes to get rid of the rule of attention.47 
Without this rule, indeed, the contextualist can easily articulate his 
anti-sceptical argument without entering automatically in a sceptical 
context.48 Many contextualists, indeed, believe that the rule of attention 
is implausible, and that mentioning or considering a certain error pos-
sibility is not enough to make the possibility salient in the context.49 As 
42 See for example Hawthorne, 2004.
43 DeRose, 2009: 159–160.
44 See for example Hansen and Chemla, 2013; and Pinillos, 2012 (Notice that, even if 
the results of Pinillos’ study may support a contextualist approach – i.e. that ordinary peo-
ple’s attributions of knowledge are in fact sensitive to practical interests, – Pinillos claims 
that interest relative invariantism, and not contextualism, can offer a better explanation 
of the data). 
45 See for example Buckwalter, 2010; 2014; 2017; Feltz and Zarpentine, 2010; Buck-
walter and Schaffer, 2015; Turri, 2017.
46 For a contextualist reply to some linguistic objections see DeRose, 2009: 153–184.
47 Ichikawa, 2017: 192. Notice that Michael Ashfield proposes a very similar move. See 
Ashfield, 2013.
48 Notice that the refusal of the rule of attention allows the contextualist to resort to 
pairs of cases in order to justify his own theory since he can ponder about propositions 
like (b) without entering automatically in a more demanding context.
49 Cohen, 2001: 93. 2. Barke, 2004. On this point see also Leardi and Vassallo, 2017: 
61–63.
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Michael Blome-Tillman rightly points out, one thing is to simply consider 
an error possibility, another is to take it seriously in an “epistemologically 
relevant sense”.50 However, one might wonder whether a contextualist, 
while discussing scepticism, can avoid considering a sceptical possibil-
ity seriously. Indeed, one could claim that assessing an anti-sceptical 
argument which acknowledges the intuitive force of scepticism compels 
to take scepticism – when it is discussed, – seriously – and so its epis-
temic standards. Yet, the contextualists could reject this conclusion – as 
Ichikawa does, – by saying that the contextualist should be happy to be 
able to articulate his anti-sceptical argument in ordinary contexts. Eval-
uating the appeal of such an anti-sceptical argument goes beyond the 
aims of this paper, yet it is worth noticing here that such an anti-scep-
tical argument seems to be weaker than its counterpart that allows the 
contextualist to acknowledge that he knows many things according to 
ordinary standards even in the more demanding context of the sceptic. 
Thus, if Brueckner and Buford’s solution seems to efficaciously solve 
the factivity problem, it saddles contextualism with certain statability 
limitations that seem to be serious issues for the contextualist’s doctrine. 
These issues seem to be resolvable by refusing the rule of attention, but 
from this move follows a weakened contextualist anti-sceptical argument. 
It is questionable, therefore, whether Brueckner and Buford’s proposal 
can be considered as proper resolution of the factivity problem.
4.3 Weak Assertions
According to Montminy and Skolits the right strategy to solve the factiv-
ity problem would consist in denying that, when the contextualist utters 
the content of his theory, he is asserting it.51 The two philosophers pro-
pose to understand (c) not as a proper assertion, but as a weak assertion, 
which is a peculiar kind of illocutionary act that includes conjectures, 
guesses and hypothesis. According to Montminy and Skolits, this would 
be the typical way that philosophers adopt when they propose or defend 
50 Blome-Tillmann, 2009: 247.
51 Montminy and Skolits, 2014: 327. 
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their views,52 thus it would not be weird for contextualists to present 
their own theory in this manner.
Contrary to outright assertions, their weak counterparts are not gov-
erned by the knowledge norm of assertion:53 a weak assertion that p is 
in fact epistemically appropriate if the speaker have some evidence that 
p – with the precise amount of evidence required that depends upon 
the strength of the assertion.54 Therefore, when Tom the contextualist 
acknowledges that Louis knows
L
 that q he won’t claim to know
H
 this 
proposition, but he will say something as “I think” or “I guess” that Louis 
knows
L
 that q. So, since the contextualist will not claim to know
H
 that (b) 
he won’t either activate the machinery of the factivity problem’s argu-
ment that leads to a contradiction.
Now, what is interesting about this approach is that although it is sim-
ilar to the one advanced by Brueckner and Buford – since it refuses the 
commitment to asymmetrical knowledge ascriptions like (c), – it tries to 
allow to the contextualists more than a sharp refutation of (c). Unfor-
tunately, however, Montminy and Skolits’ solution seems to face some 
issues. Indeed, if on the one hand one could wonder whether it entails 
the same limitations that Brueckner and Buford’s proposal involves, on 
the other it seems that the main issue of this solution concerns the evi-
dence to which the contextualist can resort to utter the “weak assertion” 
version of (c), namely: 




If Tom the contextualist could say that Louis believes that q and could 
perhaps acknowledge that Louis has enough good reasons to believe that 
q according to the standard in place in his context, it seems also that Tom 
lacks the evidence that could justify a claim like (c*). Tom, in fact, does 
not know, according to the standard in place in his own context, that q; 
furthermore, although he is a contextualist, this does not mean that he 
52 Ibid. 
53 The knowledge norm of assertion posits that we can assert a certain proposition if 
only if we know the proposition in question.
54 Montminy and Skolits, 2014: 327.
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should assume that whenever a subject claims that he knows a certain 
proposition it is true that he knows that proposition. Indeed, it could be 
the case that the proposition at issue is false. Perhaps, the contextualist 
might say that when someone claims to know a proposition he gener-
ally knows that proposition, and thus on this ground he could justify his 
utterance of (c*), yet this one seems to be a too weak and questionable 
basis. Therefore, it seems that, when the contextualist lacks knowledge 
of a certain proposition p (i.e. he does not know
H
 that p) he can refuse to 
acknowledge that another subject S knows that p according to a milder 
standard (i.e. that S knows
L
 that p) as Brueckner and Buford propose, but 
he is not in the position to make a weak assertion as “I (the contextualist) 
have some evidence to think that S knows
L
 that p”. 
4.4 A New Principle for the Transmission of Warrant
Perhaps the issue doesn’t rest upon the adequacy of single proposi-
tions like (a), (b) or (c), but concerns the different epistemic principles 
employed in the argument of the factivity problem. Bauman notably 
follows this road,55 suggesting that to solve the conundrum we should 
draw our attention to the phenomenon of the transmission of warrant.56 
Baumann, in fact, posits that a subject S
1









 a proposition p (i.e. that: “S
2
 knows 









 that p”. S
1
, indeed, despite the fact that he is in C
H
, can, accord-
ing to Baumann, know
L





 that p”.57 For a better understanding of this point consider 
the following example. According to Baumann, Tom can know
H
 certain 
conditions for the truth of 
(d). Louis knows
L
 that the sea is rough
and can know
L
 other conditions necessary for the truth of this proposi-
tion. Tom, for example, might have a really sophisticated knowledge (say, 
knowledge
H
) of Louis’ knowledge about the condition of the sea, and yet 
he could not have sophisticated knowledge (but just knowledge
L
) about 
55 Baumann, 2008; 2016. 
56 Baumann, 2008: 590.
57 Baumann, 2008: 591.
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the condition of the sea: Tom could count on a lot of reliable information 
about Louis’ epistemic situation (e.g. he could know
H
 that Louis studied 
at the Naval Military School, that he is a skilled sailor, that he always 
read the harbourmaster’s bulletin, and so on) and yet he could have 
few and not so reliable information about the fact that the sea is rough 
(i.e. he could just know
L
 that the sea is rough). Of course, Tom cannot 
know
H
 that Louis knows
L
 that the sea is rough without knowing himself 
(according to some epistemic standard) that the sea is rough, yet it is 
important to notice, claims Baumann, that the factors that define whether 





” are different from that which define whether the knowl-





”.58 Consequently, according to this view, the fact that Tom 
knows
H
 that Louis knows
L
 a certain proposition does not guarantee that 
Tom knows
H
 that very proposition; what we can infer from this fact, 
though, is that Tom knows “at a certain level” the proposition at issue. 
Indeed, as Baumann notices, when Tom is evaluating Louis’ epistemic 
situation with respect to the proposition “The sea is rough” he is deal-
ing with two questions: i) Is the sea rough? ii) Does Louis know that the 
sea is rough? And, according to Baumann, Tom can know
H
 the answer 
to the latter question and know
L
 the answer to the former. Due to this 
difference in warrant needed in order to count the answers to the former 






 that p) → p)
it might be the case that Tom knows
H
 the antecedent of (F
C
*) and that 
he knows according to another, less demanding epistemic standard, the 
consequent.59 Therefore, the following principle of the transmission of 
warrant would be incorrect:
(T). S
1






 that p → S
1
 




59 Baumann, 2008: 592. 
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and the right principle of the transmission of warrant, coherent with the 











 that p → S
1
 has 




Finally, the new principle (T
C
) entitles us to reformulate also the prin-
ciple of epistemic closure. Baumann suggests a principle of “downwards 




















 that p, then p), then there is a knowledge relation know
W
 
(not necessarily more demanding than the knowledge relation 
know
Y





At this point it seems that we have all the necessary elements to solve 
the factivity problem. Recall the argument of the conundrum: ex hypo-
thesi, Tom, the contextualist, doesn’t know
H
 that q; Louis instead knows
L
 





 that q. Now, since Tom can know
L
 that q, he is in the con-
dition to know
H
 that Louis knows
L
 that proposition without producing 
any contradiction. The factivity problem, therefore, is solved. Or, at least, 
this is the conclusion drawn by Baumann. 
Yet, it should be noted that his solution entails a really odd conse-
quence that may justify its refusal. Consider again the argument of the 
factivity problem. If it is true that, according to Baumann, Louis can 
know
H
 that Tom knows
L 
that q without producing any contradiction since 
he can know
L
 that q, it is also true that Louis can apply the factivity prin-
ciple (a principle that Baumann does not refute) to this last proposition. 
Therefore, since Louis knows
L
 that q he can conclude, via factivity, that 
q is true simpliciter. So, he can infer that
60 Baumann, 2016: 132.
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(e). It is true simpliciter that the sailboat is moored in the port of 
Naples, and I (Tom) knows
L 




and (e) is undoubtedly a really odd proposition. Baumann, however, 
maintains that after all (e) is not so odd, since it can be the case that 
sometimes in ordinary conversations we use sentences that are almost 
like (e).61 Consider this example proposed by Baumann: since you are 
planning a picnic for tomorrow, you ask to your friend Jackie, the mete-
orologist, whether tomorrow will rain; according to Baumann she might 
reply saying that
(f) No, don’t worry, it won’t rain tomorrow; I’m not talking as a 
meteorologist here, but anyway, let’s go ahead with the picnic!1
If we can agree with Baumann that Jackie’s answer does not sound 
particularly strange, it is by no means certain that (f) captures the oddity 
that characterizes those propositions that Baumann’s solution entails. 
Indeed, Baumann’s proposal seems to allow Jackie to say something as
(g). It is a plain fact that it won’t rain tomorrow, I know this fact as 
an ordinary person, but I don’t know it as a meteorologist.
and (g) does not only sound odd, but it is also rather hard to understand. 
Jackie (as well as Baumann’s contextualist) would be committed to say 
that she recognizes as true simpliciter a certain proposition, that she 
knows that proposition according to a certain standard and that, despite 
she recognizes as a plain fact the truth of the proposition at issue, she 
doesn’t know it according to another, more demanding standard. Per-
haps, as Baumann claims, the proposition (g) is not properly Moore-par-
adoxical;62 yet as Montminy and Skolits point out, a proposition like (g) 
dangerously resembles to that highly undesirable propositions – as, for 
instance, “Even though I do not know that these are not cleverly disguised 
61 Baumann, 2008: 596.
62 Baumann, 2008: 596–97.
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mules, I know that these are zebras” – that have been labelled by DeRose 
“abominable conjunctions”.63
So, since the contextualist should avoid to endorse abominable con-
junctions and even more odd propositions as (g) it seems that he, in order 
to solve the factivity problem, shouldn’t opt for the solution proposed 
by Baumann.
Concluding Remarks
In his “Contextualism and the Factivity Problem,” Baumann wonders 
about what could be the attraction of contextualism “if one cannot (at 
least as a contextualists) coherently say or think that knowledge-attribu-
tions made in lower contexts are in fact true”.64 Apparently, since Bau-
mann’s solution to the conundrum turns out to be ineffective, granting 
this possibility to contextualism seems to entail that the advocates of 
the view have to abandon the factivity principle, the closure principle or 
both of them. The price of this manoeuvre then seems to be very high, 
and on who wants to follow this path rests the burden of balancing this 
difficult choice. 
On the other hand, the contextualist who does not agree with Baumann 
about the virtues of contextualism could perhaps endorse the solution 
proposed by Brueckner and Buford. However, even in this case there 
are some difficulties; in particular, it seems that the contextualist who 
endorses this kind of solution will find himself with a weakened version 
of his anti-sceptical argument.65
Those ways of answering to the factivity problem, however, shouldn’t 
be considered the only ones at stake, and the inquiry should continue; 
and not only because contextualism needs to offer a proper response to 
this issue, but also because defining a solution for the factivity problem 
represents a remarkable way for shaping the right perimeter of a proper 
contextualist theory about knowledge-attributions. Indeed, as Baumann 
observes, “whatever response the contextualist has to offer [to the fac-
63 Montminy and Skolits, 2014: 324–25.
64 Baumann, 2008.
65 Freitag, 2011: 279.
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tivity problem], it will have far-reaching implications for the kind of con-
textualism he will be able to defend”.66
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